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HUMAN RIGHTS AND MEDIA: THE EXPERIENCE 








Increasingly UN human rights mandate-holders are engaging with diverse 
modern media to enhance the effectiveness of their work.  There are dangers 
and difficulties in doing so.  However modern media can be a useful ally in 
the work of the UN by raising awareness of grave crimes and violations; 
engaging with and empowering victims of abuse; and encouraging demands 
that investigations will be followed by action and accountability.  This article, 
based on the experience of the UN inquiry into North Korea explains the 
COI’s methodology; examines the adoption and features of its media plan; 
outlines a number of suggested basic rules to be observed by UN inquiries; 
identifies modalities of news management; and predicts likely future 
developments inherent in new media technology.  The author insists that news 
coverage is not an end in itself but a means to help attain the human rights 
goals of the inquiry and of the UN. 
 
 
MEDIA AND HUMAN RIGHTS: NATURAL BEDFELLOWS? 
 
Even in oppressive countries, those responsible for abuses of human rights 
normally perform their deeds of commission and omission in private, away 
from the glare of publicity. Publicity and news attention encourage supporters 
of global human rights to address the violations of human rights of peoples 
and individuals. They speak up and demand action. Secrecy is a cloak for 
terrible crimes and violations. 
This is why, in the current international situation, those with responsibility 
for the United Nations’ efforts to advance universal human rights, and to 
expose violators, have increasingly looked to the media (especially 
* The Hon. Michael Kirby AC CMG, Former Chair of the United Nations Human 
Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry on North Korea (2013-14); former Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on Human Rights in 
Cambodia (1993-6); one time Justice of the High Court of Australia (1996-2009). 
1 
                                                     
HUMAN RIGHTS AND MEDIA: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE 
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON NORTH KOREA 
 
international media) to support their efforts. Between the time in the 1990s 
when I discharged a mandate as Special Representative of the Secretary-
General for Human Rights in Cambodia (1993-6) and the more recent time in 
which I served as Chair of the Commission of Inquiry (COI) on alleged 
human rights violations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK) (North Korea) (2013-14),1 I noticed a significant change in the 
engagement of United Nations personnel with the media. A connection with 
media became more intensive, more time consuming and more professional. 
Moreover, it is supported from the top of the Organisation. The Secretary-
General of the United Nations (Ban Ki-moon), the High Commissioners for 
Human Rights, other agency heads and mandate-holders have become much 
more willing to engage with media and much more skilful in doing so. By this 
I mean not only local newspapers, radio and television interviews but also 
international media and the new social networks, blogs, Reddit and the 
internet generally. Together these media can bring news, information and 
opinions of UN experts on human rights to an audience far wider than that 
which, in the past, had access to UN reports on human rights concerns. 
There are, of course, dangers in such engagement. They include: 
 
∗ The capacity of hostile media to distort, edit and manipulatively 
abbreviate interviews, so as to cast the United Nations and its officials 
in a bad light;  
 
∗ The danger of media that has its own partial agenda and biased 
viewpoint that will distort the messages that the UN officials try to 
convey; 
 
∗ The growth of opinionated journalists; superficial "celebrity" coverage 
of serious events; and the deliberate or negligent misrepresentation of 
news stories dealing with human rights problems. By definition, these 
problems are ordinarily serious and deserving of a careful reportage 
that respects complaining victims and is also fair and accurate towards 
alleged perpetrators; and 
 
∗ The vicissitudes of modern media today include the priority given to 
personality, colourful celebrities and visual stories, particularly those 
designed to tug the heart strings or to enflame the passions of the 
audience. These can sometimes distort the stories themselves and 
influence competing priorities.  
1 Established by the United Nations, Human Rights Council, resolution 22/13, 
adopted 21 March 2013. 
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These problems, which have become magnified over the past 20 years, 
were amongst the reasons why some early office-holders of the United 
Nations were suspicious of media and often inclined to keep their distance. 
Other problems arise from the varying skills of mandate-holders, including in 
their respective linguistic abilities, in coping with the pressures of media 
questioning, particularly in circumstances that are highly charged, sensitive 
and potentially dangerous. This article acknowledges the dangers and 
difficulties. However, it proceeds on the assumption that, used with care and 
skill, the modern media can become an important ally for the United Nations’ 
efforts to uphold and defend universal human rights. This proposition will be 
illustrated by reference to lessons taught by the COI on North Korea. 
 
ESTABLISHMENT AND METHODOLGY  
 
The COI on DPRK got underway after 7 May 2013 when the President of 
the Human Rights Council (HRC) appointed Sonja Biserko (a human rights 
expert from Serbia) and myself (a former judge in Australia) to join the 
Special Rapporteur on DPRK, Marzuki Darusman (Indonesia), as members of 
the COI. I was designated to serve as the Chair.  
The mandate given to the COI specified nine substantive areas upon 
which reports had been received by the United Nations of serious and 
widespread violations of human rights. By its resolution, the HRC urged the 
government of DPRK to cooperate fully with the COI’s investigation; to 
permit the members of the COI unrestricted access to the country; and to 
provide them with all necessary information to allow the fulfilment of the 
mandate. However, the Ambassador of DPRK in Geneva immediately 
rejected the establishment of the COI. He indicated that DPRK would not 
cooperate.2 This position was not altered in the course of the investigation. 
Accordingly, the COI was unable to extend its investigation to on the spot 
scrutiny of the situation of human rights in DPRK. This was an undoubted 
disadvantage. But just as, in national jurisdiction, it cannot be left to a party 
suspected of grave violations in the law to determine whether or not it will 
cooperate with a body lawfully created to conduct such investigations, so in 
international jurisdiction the non-cooperation of DPRK could not be allowed 
to deflect the COI from performing its duty. 
At the end of the investigation, in a comment on the report of the COI, the 
representative of China expressed the view that, as the COI had not been able 
2 Letter from DPRK dated 10 May 2013 to the President of the Human Rights 
Council. See report of the detailed findings of the Commission of Inquiry on Human 
Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, A/HRC/25/CRP.1 (7 February 
2014), 8-9 [21]. 
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to persuade the country concerned (DPRK) to cooperate, its report was 
necessarily flawed and deprived of essential evidentiary material and thus 
legitimacy. This cannot be the way in which the Charter of the United 
Nations is intended to operate. Effectively, such a view would give every state 
of the Organisation a veto power. Under the Charter, only the Permanent 
Members of the Security Council enjoy the exceptional power of an effective 
veto, and then only in validating defined decisions of the Security Council on 
non-procedural matters, in respect of which the concurring votes of the 
Permanent Members must be included in the majority outcome.3  
Nevertheless, for reasons of ensuring a thorough, impartial and effective 
investigation, and to address the optics of the inaccessibility of the country 
and people most concerned, the COI addressed the issue of its methodology at 
its first meeting held in Geneva on 1-5 July 2014. It decided to advertise 
widely for submissions and to conduct public hearings before which witnesses 
for whom it would be safe, could provide oral testimony. 
In the result, a large number of witnesses, including some institutional and 
some with special expertise, approached the Commission to give evidence. To 
meet the potential criticism that these witnesses were self-selecting and 
unacceptably prejudiced against DPRK, the COI decided, with the approval of 
the witnesses, to film the evidence and to place it online. Where it was judged 
to be unsafe or risky to do so, either the witness would be interviewed in 
confidential session and not filmed or photographed, or improvisations would 
be adopted (disguises of various kinds) to fulfil the mandate instruction to 
avoid any risks to the witnesses.  
The foregoing decisions were to prove time consuming and demanding for 
the members of the COI and its secretariat, as for some witnesses. There were 
various logistical difficulties, including the necessity of translation of 
evidence and security for witnesses. However, the methodology adopted 
afforded the COI, where it accepted the witness testimony, an appropriate 
response to the charge of partiality. Critics and the merely curious could be 
invited themselves to view the witness testimony. In this way modern 
information technology, supported by the interest of international news media, 
brought the veracity question directly to the interested international audience. 
Because, overwhelmingly, the witnesses were plainly truthful and commonly 
impressive, the transparency adopted by the COI constituted an antidote to the 
criticisms levelled against it by DPRK and China. 
Subsequent efforts of the COI, in cooperation with the governments of the 
Republic of Korea (South Korea) (ROK) and Japan, secured transcripts of the 
oral testimony. These were made available both in English and in the 
3 United Nations, Charter, 26 June 1945; 59 stat. 1031; TS 993, 3 Bevans 1153, 
entered into force 24 October 1945, Article 27.3. 
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language in which the witness gave evidence. Like the digital images, these 
transcripts were later uploaded on the website of the COI. 
In addition to these matters of methodology, the COI, in the spirit of 
transparency, also consulted the major national missions having an interest in 
the situation in North Korea: Australia, China, France, Laos, the Russian 
Federation, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. 
Later, meetings in Geneva with regional participants from Africa, ASEAN, 
Europe and Latin America permitted outreach to most countries with a special 
interest in DPRK. 
The conduct of public hearings in Seoul (20-24 August 2013); Tokyo (29-
30 August 2013); London (23 October 2013) and Washington DC (30-31 
October 2013) produced a powerful body of testimony that became highly 
visible on several continents. Often the testimony was extremely vivid, 
dramatic and distressing. The manner in which the COI went about its task 
was therefore adapted to modern media: radio, television, print media, the 
internet and social media. If the medium in the contemporary world is to some 
extent the message, the methodology of the COI on DPRK projected a potent 
message of transparency. It demonstrated the impartiality of the 
commissioners, both in the way in which they gathered evidence by non-
leading questions and in their assessment of the evidence itself as credible, 
reasonable and normally convincing, even understated. In this way, the 
methodology chosen by the commissioners re-enforced the success of the way 
in which the COI went about its work. It helped to neutralise the non-
cooperation of DPRK. It provided intensely powerful statements of apparent 
veracity. It also afforded the COI a pool of vivid evidence with which to 
illustrate its investigations of the nine subject areas nominated by the mandate 
from the HRC. In the subsequent write up of the report of the COI, it was 
therefore possible to include, effectively on every second page, quotations 
from the hearing transcripts. These allowed victims of grave human rights 
abuses to describe their ordeals in their own language. By quoting them, the 
COI gave them a voice to the highest levels of the United Nations and the 
international community. It also avoided the inevitable tendency of second 
and third hand versions of evidence to reduce the power of witness 
expositions by mediating them through the analysis and impressions of third 
parties, however expert.  
Apart from every other utility of this source of evidentiary material, the 
technique of public hearings afforded to the media a large pool of expressive 
evidence, in direct speech, from which media could freely quote. In this way, 
the methodology of the COI was well adapted to the modern techniques of 
media reporting. Generally, these seek to concretise large, opaque issues by 
invoking the described experience and reactions of the named witnesses. 
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ADOPTING A MEDIA PLAN 
 
Although none of the Commissioners of the COI on DPRK was a 
journalist by training, each had viewed the operation of modern media in their 
own country. In my own case, a period of service as Chairman of the 
Australian Law Reform Commission in 1975-84 had given me the experience 
of working with national media to explain, justify and promote institutional 
recommendations for law reform. Accordingly, in my own country, 20 years 
earlier, I had a decade’s experience of working with print and electronic 
media.  
Further, during my service as Special Representative of the Secretary-
General for Human Rights in Cambodia, I had insisted on engagement with 
local, national and international media. At the end of each visit to Cambodia 
as Special Representative, a media conference was conducted. Even in the 
1990s, this was the usual practice of human rights mandate-holders for the 
United Nations.4 This practice is an important aspect of transparency and free 
speech, which is itself a basic human right. However, it has to be handled with 
care to avoid needless criticism by the governments concerned, hostility, and 
allegations of bias and pre-judgment. The COI on DPRK was fully alert to 
these risks and it avoided them.  
To ensure the availability of expert guidance in dealing with the media, 
the COI engaged for its visits to Seoul and Tokyo in August 2013, a journalist 
with extensive experience in the human rights work of the United Nations, Mr 
Ron Redmond, a United States national. At the request of the COI, he 
developed a media plan. This was basically adhered to throughout the work of 
the COI. 
Mr Redmond was not available for the COI’s public hearings in London 
nor subsequently. However, at that time, the COI secured the support and 
assistance of a senior officer in the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR), Mr Rolando Gomez. He also assisted the COI in 
relation to its engagements with the General Assembly (3rd Committee) in 
October 2013 and later the "Arria Procedure" to brief members of the Security 
Council (17 April 2014). In addition, for engagements in Geneva, particularly 
with the HRC, side events in the Palais de Nations and with engagements with 
UN and independent news media in Geneva, the COI had the support and 
assistance of Mr Rupert Colville and Ms Liz Throssell. They helped arrange 
the media conferences that took place in Geneva at the time of the Oral 
Update of the HRC (September 2013), the release online of the English 
language version of the COI report (17 February 2014) and the formal 
4 Ted Piccone, Catalysts for Change: How the UNs Independent Experts Promote 
Human Rights (Brookings Institution 2012) 23-24, 31-32, 116, 125. 
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presentation of the report to the HRC and engagement with the HRC members 
and other nations (17 March 2014). The media conferences, and follow up 
media interviews in Geneva and the media ‘stake out’ in New York after the 
Arria Procedure in the UN Headquarters on 17 April 2014, were all very 
heavily attended by media. Each such engagement lasted more than an hour. 
Each was heavily reported in local and international print and electronic 
media, as well as in social media and on the internet.  
The media plan initially, devised by Mr Redmond, involved a number of 
initiatives: 
 
∗ Information Brochure: A number of frequently asked questions were 
addressed in detail. These contained clarifications of the mandate of 
the COI, expressed in language that could be picked up and used in 
media reports. It also included a description of what a COI was; what 
the mandate of the COI on DPRK provided; the history and 
background of the COI; the identities and short biographies of the 
commissioners; an analysis of the mandate; an outline of the 
immediate program of the COI; and some quotes that could be 
attributed to the commissioners in relation to the immediately pending 
public session of the COI; 
 
∗ Media Releases: In advance of each series of public hearings and the 
other engagements in Geneva, Washington and New York, media 
releases were produced and widely distributed through the UN media 
contacts. These gave different angles on the work of the COI and on 
the purpose of the upcoming engagements. For the public hearings in 
Seoul and Tokyo, translations of the media releases into the local 
language were provided. This was also done in advance of subsequent 
important engagements of the COI; 
 
∗ Interviews: A schedule of interviews was prepared and approved by 
the commissioners in advance of the engagements of the COI both for 
public hearings and also consultations in Geneva and New York. As 
well, indications were provided as to how additional interviews might 
be secured and contacts were given to permit direct enlistment of the 
help of the COI media officer. 
 
∗ Embargos: Strict embargos were assigned to a number of 
engagements, including the oral updates in Geneva and New York in 
2013, the initial release of the COI report to the media in February 
2014; and the presentation of the COI report to the HRC and members 
of the Security Council, respectively, in March and April 2014. One 
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international news service appeared to breach the embargo specified 
for the initial release of the report. This potentially endangered the 
impact of the primary release of the findings of the COI. Immediate 
efforts of the Geneva-based media officers circumvented what could 
have been a serious disturbance of the hoped-for impact of the COI 
report. In the result, as a sanction, the offending agency was excluded 
from the ensuing media conference in Geneva, although not without 
protests and excuses offered on its behalf. 
 
∗ Social Networks: An officer of the Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (OHCHR) handles the release of human rights 
material on social networks, including Twitter, Weibo, You Tube, 
Reddit, blogs and other modalities. This expertise was enlisted to 
ensure maximum possible distribution of the COI’s media material. 
The consequence was one of the most widespread and powerful 
examples ever of news coverage in the human rights field. Of course, 
the readability, attractions and significance of the COI report itself 
assisted in this endeavour. International news media is particularly 
discerning in the attention it gives to news stories. It is also resistant 
to attempts to "puff" news stories into a significance that they 
inherently lack. The widespread coverage of the successive stages of 
engagement of the COI on DPRK with news media was commented 
upon in many places, including in observations by senior officers of 
OHCHR.5 
 
∗ Follow up and Assessment: At my request, following the conclusion 
of his engagement with the COI, the initial media officer who 
formulated the media plan, Mr Redmond, prepared an assessment of 
the lessons and a description of the COI’s media engagement.6 This 
assessment is candid. It addresses such issues as planning guidelines; 
the importance of local field support; the requirements of suitable 
venues for public hearings; the assessment of local interest; the 
possible necessity of procedures for registration of media; the 
handling of interview requests; the monitoring of media coverage; the 
conduct of post hearing media conferences; and the utilisation and 
5 M Rishmawi, “The Role of Human Rights Fact Finding in the Prevention of 
Genocide”, unpublished paper for International Conference on Prevention of 
Genocide, Brussels, March 2014, referring at p 2 to the Commission on the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory and Southern Israel, 2009, (Judge Richard Goldstone, President). 
6 Ronald Redmond, “Media Relations for COI Public Hearings in the Field: Lessons 
Learned from the COI on Human Rights in DPRK”, unpublished, OHCHR, 2013. 
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archiving of video materials, transcripts and other records. The report 
also contains a number of useful recommendations for COIs of the 
United Nations Human Rights system in the future. Future suggested 
activities include the creation of dedicated websites for the COI on 
DPRK; the posting on them of electronic copies of the report of the 
COI; the inclusion of speeches of commissioners given in the course 
of the performance of their duties; transcripts of media conferences; 
news coverage; photographs and other materials. The posting of non-
English language media materials and of translations into other 
languages of the Report and Detailed Findings of the COI are 
imperatives to ensure the success of the COI in reaching out beyond a 
purely English language audience.  
 
In what follows, a number of basic rules for the conduct of COIs will be 
mentioned. These have no official significance but are possibly useful 
indications for those who work in advancing the United Nations’ cause of 
protecting and upholding human rights through the mandates given to bodies 
such as COIs and to individuals such as special rapporteurs as well as 
dedicated committees and agencies.  
 
SOME BASIC RULES 
 
∗ Maintaining a cool temper: Recently, when addressing a conference, 
the microphone system broke down for the third time.  I protested 
somewhat bluntly in frustration. Whilst this was a natural human 
reaction, it was damaging to the message and looked inappropriate in 
the recording preserving the passing event for repeated viewings. 
Unerring patience is called for in all dealings with media, particularly 
where these activities are filmed or otherwise recorded; 
 
∗ Clarification of context: Preferably before recording begins, It is 
important to clarify whether the interview is live or pre-recorded; on 
or off the record; will or will not be edited; and will or will not be 
open to correction and a fresh take if the interviewee is unhappy with 
the question or answer or conditions maintained during the interview. 
It will also be important to clarify any embargo that will be observed 
by the media, where that is required or desired;  
 
∗ Personality, infotainment: Some modern media, as stated above, 
trivialise serious stories and reduce them to superficial or predictable 
images. Many questions were addressed to me concerning the 
emotional impact of the COI testimony of human rights abuses on me, 
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personally. It is important to answer such questions honestly but 
briefly. Of course, the important issue is not the emotions of the COI 
member but (for crimes against humanity) the condemnation of the 
international community. However, a refusal to answer may seem 
over-proud. A well answered response may help to bring home to the 
audience the inevitable feeling of revulsion. It may give the response 
a concrete and personal edge that helps to convey the emotions which 
should be felt by viewers and listeners alike when confronted with 
certain evidence. However, the interviewee should not be misled into 
thinking that his or her reactions are significant in themselves; 
 
∗ Time constraints: Modern media increasingly operates under time 
constraints shorter than was the case in earlier times. Sometimes this 
can be irritating, as where a question is asked and, in the midst of the 
answer, the interviewee is interrupted to be told “we must leave it 
there”. The proper reaction is to attempt to wind up quickly and not to 
show irritation, however justifiable this might be. Interviewees must 
also learn to be brief. Often this is difficult for lawyers and other 
professional experts. They may know many complications and 
qualifications. But brevity is crucial to good media messaging; 
 
∗ Bite size: In answering questions, it is best to provide communication 
in bite size chunks so that the questioner can get in more questions. 
Interviewers sometimes themselves have big egos and occasionally 
aspire to be, or become, “media personalities”. Lawyers and other 
experts frequently see multiple ramifications and even potential traps 
in media questions. This does not provide a justification for 
longwinded answers, with multiple layers of qualification and 
elaboration. The primary rule is KISS: Keep It Simple Stupid, the 
message reportedly given to Hubert Humphrey, an unsuccessful US 
Presidential candidate, by his wife. It remains a good injunction. 
Presumably he did not follow it. He lost the election; 
 
∗ Exhibiting calm: A good interviewee will remain calm, civil, polite 
and courteous at all times. This also exudes an image important for 
human rights. Universal human rights are expressed with the authority 
of the United Nations and international law. United Nations mandate-
holders can therefore afford to be calm. They deserve to be 
authoritative. They are speaking in support of an important and global 
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∗ Cultural issues: It is essential to avoid discriminatory language or 
implications and to ensure respect for all relevant minorities and local 
cultures, at least so far as they conform to universal human rights. 
Naturally, local audiences will ordinarily be proud of their cultures, 
society, religions and values. Where these are criticised by a mandate 
holder, by reference to a norm of universal human rights, it should be 
done carefully, accurately and respectfully; 
 
∗ Gender sensitivity: It is desirable that COIs undertake consultations 
with UN Women and, where possible, have a dedicated gender 
adviser who will scrutinise documents, including drafts for media 
reports and ensure attention to gender-specific issues and the 
avoidance of gender unfriendly language, patriarchal values or 
apparently insensitive appearances, attitudes or actions; 
 
∗ Training and experience: After rudimentary training and opportunities 
to exercise their skills non-experts can become skilled in media 
presentation. It is desirable that COIs should have available to them 
experienced media advisers (as the COI on DPRK did for a time). 
Commonly, such advisers will remain present during interviews and 
offer constructive criticisms and comments for improvement of 
individual interview techniques and clarification of key messages. 
COI members, who may not have experience in media engagement, 
should not be embarrassed to ask for advice because such engagement 
is an increasingly important part of the work of human rights for UN 
COIs and other mandate-holders. Incompetence, arrogance, hot 
temper, needless politicisation, unprofessional behaviour, sexism, 
racism, homophobia, abuse of authority and other errors must be 
avoided. Media will often be vigilant and unhesitating in reporting 
such faults. On the other hand, if the COI has manifest integrity, is 
clearly striving to be impartial, truthful and compliant with principle, 
media will usually detect these features and be supportive. This is not 
universally so as some media outlets or individuals have their own 
agendas to pursue. But normally, the working journalist will have an 
interest in common with a COI or other mandate-holder. This is to get 
out a story that is brief, accurate and interesting. This is the 
motivation that COI members and their secretariats must engage with; 
 
∗ Human interest: The methodology of much modern media is to avoid 
abstract concepts and to illustrate problems with human interest 
stories. Whilst this can sometimes be irritating and can result in 
superficial, personalised coverage of complex and serious issues and 
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repeated use of particular stories, it is also a way of rendering human 
rights abuses concrete and understandable for ordinary readers, 
listeners and viewers. COI members must therefore consider the ways 
in which particular testimony (especially if there have been public 
hearings or other non-confidential interviews) can help illustrate large 
points being advanced by the COI. A strength of the report of the COI 
on DPRK derived from the fact that, on about half of the pages of the 
report, vivid passages are quoted from the public hearings or other 
interviews conducted by the COI that help to bring to life the 
suffering involved in human rights abuses. They do this in a way that 
dense text and detailed reporting might not do. Moreover, such quotes 
can be picked up and used later, in media releases, in oral television 
grabs and in print media reports. They will tend to be used, and so 
repeated, in syndicated news items, op eds and editorial opinions; 
 
∗ Debriefing: At the conclusion of every day of work of the COI or 
other mandate holder’s work in the field and in public outreach it is 
useful to engage in a debriefing exercise so that commissioners, in 
consultation with the secretariat and (if there is one) the media adviser 
can go through the events of the day; note the main messages that 
emerged from those events; and review how to express those 
messages more succinctly and effectively in the media messages that 
follow. This is also a time and opportunity for secretariat officers to 
correct any factual errors – however small – that may have crept into 
media statement and comments by the Commissioners. It is easy to 
feel irritated by such corrections. However, they are usually well-
intentioned and designed to protect the mandate holder from 
immaterial attack based on factual errors or misstatements of the 
evidence; and 
 
∗ News analysis: In addition to internal debriefing of the COI, it is 
desirable that assistance be provided to the COI (and other mandate-
holders) by way of follow up analysis of news coverage, descriptions 
of the "hits" on the dedicated COI/mandate website; and tweets and 
other social networks concerned with the COI or other mandates. A 
record should be kept, whether electronic or in print form, of media 
coverage so that this will become part of the chronological archives of 
the project. Such media coverage, particularly if online, helps those 
who come later to describe and analyse the conduct of the COI and to 
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MESSAGING AND NEWS MANAGEMENT 
 
In most societies, it is not ultimately possible for a COI to manage the 
presentation of, and priority given to, its media messages. News media are 
properly vigilant as to their own role in news selection and presentation. 
Nevertheless, a number of sensible rules may be observed that enhance the 
coverage of the desired news story: 
 
∗ Variety and new material: The COI should decide for itself upon clear 
themes and messages. It should also continually vary some messages 
in order to avoid media fatigue that will be exacerbated by repetition 
of old news; 
 
∗ Simple messages: It is highly desirable that messaging should be kept 
simple and avoid unduly complex issues of law, history and policy 
which may be of interest and importance to experts but of less 
concern to most journalists and consumers of news media. Excessive 
detail in media releases is likely to kill media interest in the COI once 
and for the future; 
 
∗ Basic rules: It is usually best for commissioners to adhere to short 
sentences; to avoid the use of the passive voice; to stick to some clear 
and repeated messages; and, on the main themes of their work, to 
agree on language into which those messages should be packaged by 
the several COI members; 
 
∗ Assertions: It can be useful, where it is the fact, to assert appropriately 
the observance by the COI of the principles of impartiality, 
independence, due process and procedural fairness and to illustrate 
these merits by reference to the activities of the COI which can be 
described. For example, the point was often made that a number of the 
witnesses giving oral testimony to the COI on DPRK insisted on their 
love for Kim Il-sung, the first member of the Kim family of Supreme 
Leaders of North Korea. This protestation was usually on indication 
of the honesty and neutrality of the witnesses. It tended to contradict 
the assertion by DPRK that the witnesses were “human scum” and 
hopelessly biased against the DPRK regime; 
 
∗ Appearance: It is desirable for COI members and staff to attend to 
basic matters of appearance for television filming: combing the hair, 
fixing the tie or scarf, removing nasal hairs, dusting shoulders etc. 
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These are simple matters but appearance is inescapably important in 
messaging in modern media, particularly visual media; 
 
∗ Over familiarity: Some journalists seek to ingratiate themselves by 
assuming terms of familiarity. Generally, it is best for UN officers to 
avoid undue familiarity and the use of first names with media 
personnel at least whilst on film or radio interviews. Without 
becoming pompous or appearing self-important, it should be 
remembered that the issues of human rights are invariably serious and 
too much informality or the injection of inappropriate humour will not 
be considered correct by most readers, listeners or viewers; and 
 
∗ Bullying: Some media employees may try to pressure or bully the 
interviewee. This can be politely rejected and deflected. Losing one’s 
temper whilst being filmed is not a good look. Staying calm is 
imperative and it attracts admiration. 
 
GLOBAL MEDIA AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Appreciation: Where media have helped a COI, the help should be 
reciprocated. In the case of the North Korea Inquiry, the earliest possible 
copies of the COI report were distributed to media on the day of release, 
subject to embargo. Special care was taken to supply journalists who had 
accurately reported the hearings and activities of a COI. Where media 
advisers have helped the COI, their help should be acknowledged both to 
them and to their superiors and drawn to the notice of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights. The days of regarding media as an enemy to United 
Nations’ operations are over. Especially in the discharge of human rights 
mandates, media can be influential in spreading the awareness of human 
rights abuses; alerting those concerned about the existence of a mandate and 
where to contact the mandate-holder(s); informing the world community of 
the steps taken to expose and redress serious wrongs; and raising expectations 
that perpetrators of human rights abuses everywhere will be rendered 
accountable, both before the Human Rights Council and in follow up before 
appropriate institutions of international criminal justice.  
Reports: The advances in the technology of contemporary media make it 
appropriate to envisage changes in the format future of HCR reports. Already 
such reports, available online, permit links to be made to earlier reports and 
other relevant sources of information. In the future it may be anticipated that 
access will also be provided to victim statements, graphic photographs and 
moving film; and statistical and like data displayed in attractive format. 
Reports quoting victims will become multimedia in character and permit the 
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victims to speak, directly, not mediated through the analysis of reporters. An 
application by the COI on DPRK to the Human Rights Council to supplement 
the textual/oral presentation of its oral report to the HRC with digital images 
containing the voices of victims recorded at its public hearings was declined 
by the Presidency. The Presidency expressed concern about potential misuse 
of such technology. This risk can perhaps be understood. However, because 
most media communication today has become multimedia, it must be 
expected that reports to the HRC will eventually follow suit. 
Mobilising the enlarged potential: It behoves all, who are engaged in the 
work of human rights and with the OHCHR, to use the potential of new 
technology of media more effectively. In this, I believe that High 
Commissioner Pillay (HCHR) gave a particularly important lead. So, I 
believe, did the COI in DPRK.  
Mobilising social media: Officers of OHCHR are now available to advise 
commissioners (typically of a different generation) concerning the potential of 
social media to expand and enlarge access to human rights mandate reports. 
These can reach large and different, usually younger, audiences. They also 
require new styles of reporting, in terms that are briefer and sharper, with 
much less patience for detail. 
Blogging and Tweets: Some present and future COI members may be 
tempted to blog or tweet their personal opinions about their work.  Some such 
messaging may not always have been sufficiently thought out. Care must be 
observed to avoid showing prejudgment or breaching due process 
requirements by revealing provisional COI deliberations out of due order or 
accidentally breaching security. Nevertheless, because many younger people 
secure news and information today through these means, they will 
undoubtedly come to play a significant part: informing interested persons 
about the COI or other mandate, its activities and impressions, wherever 
permissible. If necessary, mandate holders should seek, and obtain, 
professional assistance from inside the Office of the UNHCHR on how to use 
new media and how to avoid the pitfalls. 
Availability of Commissioners: COI commissioners and other mandate 
holders should be available, and not hostile, to modern media. High 
Commissioner Pillay was particularly skilful in using global media. She 
thereby enhanced the worldwide awareness of the work of her Office and of 
the independent mandate-holders who report to the HRC. 
 
PROBLEMS OF AVAILABLITY 
 
Because of the often intense work of the COI, the long hours, in some 
cases working in a foreign language, and the pressures of responsibility, 
engagement with the media may sometimes slip to the bottom of the list. 
 15 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND MEDIA: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE 
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON NORTH KOREA 
 
However, this attitude should be resisted because of the potential, properly 
performed, for media engagement to enhance and re-enforce, and not detract 
from, the work of the COI. A number of simple rules can be used in 
engagements with the media: 
 
∗ Attitudes: It is important not to regard the media as an enemy or 
hostile competitor. In rare cases hostility may exist or eventuate. But 
generally, media have an interest in common with the UN officers: to 
spread knowledge about the work; to encourage cooperation; to raise 
visibility; and to promote expectations of successful and practical 
outcomes; 
 
∗ Deadlines: Particular difficulty is often presented by media deadlines. 
These arise every day and at differing times of the day. COI members 
must, so far as they seek to interest and mobilise media, be conscious 
of deadlines and of their frequent inflexibility. They must strive to 
work within the realities of media deadlines. So far as is consistent 
with the fulfilment of the mandate, a COI should strive to release and 
embargo media releases with such deadlines in mind; 
 
∗ Competition: Media interests will often be in competition. Care must 
therefore be taken to observe even-handedness, to avoiding 
"favourites" and to engage with all media on the basis of equality, 
courtesy and mutual respect; 
 
∗ Embargoes: It is important for any embargo on the publication of a 
media report to be made completely clear, including by reference to 
relevant international time zones. Likewise, it is vital to be clear 
where speaking to the media is "off the record" or by way of 
"background" only. Generally such limited communications should be 
minimised. A COI should operate transparently and honourably; and 
this generally means speaking and acting on the record when both 
parties to the briefing know precisely what material is available for 
quotation and broadcast. Confidential information will require 
protection. Great care must be taken to safeguard the identity and 
evidence of confidential witnesses. Their safety and even their lives 
may depend on it; 
 
∗ Photographs: It is desirable that good quality photographs of the 
Commissioners should be available and provided by the secretariat or 
media officer to media interests; 
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∗ Informal photographs: Media will often seek informal photographs or 
film showing the COI at work. Care should be taken to check any 
surrounding personnel or witnesses; background images and potential 
embarrassments; 
 
∗ Media officer: Wherever possible, a dedicated media officer (or 
OHCHR media personnel) should be engaged to assist the COI and to 
propose successive cycles of media releases and interviews for 
consideration by the commissioners as the work of the COI unfolds; 
 
∗ Establishing website: A dedicated website for the COI should be 
established soon after its establishment. Onto this website should be 
posted regular updated materials concerning the program and 
activities of the COI; and 
 
∗ Variety of voices: It is desirable that a variety of voices for the COI 
should be heard. This will involve deflection of particular questions at 
a media conference, for example, so that all Commissioners become 
identifiable and bring their several interests and talents into play. 
Diversion of questions to other commissioners should be carried out, 
preferably with their prior concurrence. In the presentation of the oral 
report of the COI on DPRK to the Arria briefing of the Security 
Council on 17 April 2014 in New York, the course was adopted of 
dividing the oral remarks so that each Commissioner spoke. This 
ensured that a variety of voices was heard. It relieved the potential 
monotony of a single voice. It demonstrated the unity, and also any 
special interests, of the COI members. In particular, in the case of the 
COI on DPRK, it allowed the highly responsible role of women in the 
COI’s work to be clearly demonstrated.  
 
CONCLUSION: BENEFICIAL SYMBIOSIS 
 
I pay a tribute to the Commissioners and secretariat of the COI on DPRK 
for their industry, adaptability and willingness to innovate in relation to media 
engagement. The COI demonstrated clearly that no country today can pull 
down the shutters and prevent the scrutiny of its human rights record by the 
United Nations, simply by refusing to cooperate. A commission of inquiry 
today may cross even the most hostile border. It may negotiate the loftiest 
prison walls and bring the message of human rights abuses to the notice of the 
world through global news media and the internet. Nowadays, as was said in 
the context of DPRK, no one has an excuse to say they do not know of human 
rights abuses brought to light by the United Nations. Now we all know. And 
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that knowledge propels us to seek to address, and to demand, accountability: 
justly, effectively and quickly. 
It is still too early to judge the success of the COI on DPRK.  All of the 
Commissioners insisted that success was not to be assessed simply by 
reference to the provision of a report, however well written and widely 
covered. Success depends on positive outcomes on the recommendations 
made by the COI: an improvement in the human rights situation for the people 
of Korea; an enhancement of cooperation by the state concerned with the 
OHCHR, the HRC, the General Assembly and the Security Council; and 
greater knowledge and understanding of the situation in DPRK in the wider 
world. Judged by these criteria the COI on DPRK chalked up a number of 
achievements. Several of these lay in the context of engagement with the 
media. The full story is yet to be written.  
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